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FROM NUREMBERG TO ARUSHA

Accountability for violations of humanitarian law has come
a long way since Peter von Hagenbach, governor of the Austrian
town of Breisach in 1474, was put on trial following a revolt for
what today would be described as crimes against humanity.
More than five centuries ago, in what is considered the first war
crimes trial in recorded Western history, the prosecutor indicted the accused as having "[t]rampled under foot the laws of
God and man."' Von Hagenbach, who acted under the instructions of his master, Charles of Burgardy, in seeking to subjugate Breisach, was accused of engaging with his thugs in acts of
extreme brutality: murder, rape, and pillage among others. "No
conceivable evil," wrote a contemporary historian, "was beyond
him."2 The accused's defense of superior orders did not avail
him, and a court of twenty-eight judges found von Hagenbach
guilty and sentenced him to death.
Between then and now, other attempts were made by
groups of States to enforce humanitarian law in the 20th century. One attempt failed but three others succeeded. The failed
attempt was a design by the Allies in World War I to prosecute
Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany and twenty-one other suspects
after the war for war crimes in an international tribunal. The
attempt was thwarted when the Kaiser took refuge in the
Netherlands .3
Accountability for violations of humanitarian law took root
only after World War II, when the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 4 and the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East were established by the Allied Powers to prosecute
German and Japanese war criminals. The next major advance
1 GEORGE SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, 465 no.10 (1968) (quoting JOHN KNEBEL CAPELLANI, BASIL DIARY 1473-1476).
2 Id.
3 See Jules Deschenes, Toward InternationalCriminal Justice, in ROGER S.
CLARK AND MADELEINE SANN, THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 32
(1996).
4 See London Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,
Aug. 8, 1945. The London Charter was signed by France, United Kingdom of

Great Britain, and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. It subsequently won
the support of 19 other governments. The charter for the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East was subsequently issued by United States General
Douglas McArthur.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol14/iss2/3

2

2002]

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

275

in international humanitarian law was the establishment, by
the United Nations Security Council in May 1993, 5 of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
at the Hague, Netherlands, followed eighteen months later by
the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) 6 at Arusha, Tanzania.
The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were the first modern application of international humanitarian law on a significant
scale, i.e., multiple trials of individuals. It is thus not surprising that Nuremberg and the two United Nations international
criminal tribunals are discussed in one breath as if the two sets
of processes are one unbroken line of continuity. This is far
from being the case; while the two processes were established to
exact accountability for heinous crimes, there are very fundamental and important differences between the post World War
II trials and the contemporary United Nations tribunals. It is
necessary to understand these differences in order to fully appreciate the contribution of the ICTR to the promotion and ob7
servance of international humanitarian law.
First, the very nature of the two sets of tribunals is different: the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were established by
the victorious powers of World War II. The Rwanda and Yugoslavia Tribunals, by contrast, are the first international criminal tribunals to be established by the international community,
independently of the victorious powers of a conflict. The UN ad
hoc tribunals were created by an international organization reflecting the political will of a broad section of the international
8
community.
5 See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
6 See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
7 See Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, The Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda and the
Development of an Effective InternationalCriminal Law - Legal Politicaland Policy Dimensions, in HUMANITARES VOLKERRECHT, NoMos VERLAJSGESELLSCHAFr
437, 438 (Jana Hasse, et al. eds. 2001).
8 See generally PAUL J. MAGNARELLA, JUSTICE IN AFRICA: RWANDA'S GENOCIDE, ITS COURTS, AND THE UN CRIMINAL TRIBuNAL 111-13 (2000). While the Nuremberg trials have been criticized by some historians as "victors' justice," the two
United Nations Tribunals have not totally escaped this charge either, with accused
persons and their political sympathizers occasionally charging that the Rwanda
and Yugoslavia Tribunals are a dynamic of their defeat in the conflicts in Rwanda
and the former Yugoslavia. In the case of Rwanda, the Rwandan government that
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Second, the Nuremberg and Tokyo prosecutions were for
crimes committed in classic international wars between countries. In a fundamental contribution to the development of international humanitarian law, the ICTR is the first
international criminal tribunal with a mandate to adjudicate violations of humanitarian law committed in a non-international
armed conflict, i.e., a civil war. This is a major advance not only
because it strengthens the norm of individual criminal responsibility for "universal" crimes such as genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes, regardless of the context in which
the crimes were committed, but also because, in practice, most
of the conflicts that have occurred in Africa have been civil
wars.
Third, while the Nuremberg Charter labeled certain organizations of the then German State "criminal organizations," 9
the UN Tribunals have restricted themselves to the individual
culpability of the accused persons. At the ICTR, for example,
some of the individuals whom it has convicted were active members of, instructed or acted in collision with, the Interhamwe
("those who work together") militia, a youth wing of the ruling
political party at the time they actively executed the genocide. 10
came to power following its military defeat of the previous government requested
the establishment of an international tribunal to try the perpetrators of the genocide, which, by common acknowledgment worldwide, had indeed occurred. However, the Rwandan government itself subsequently voted against the creation of
the ICTR because, among other reasons, its Statute did not provide for the death
penalty. By going ahead to establish the Tribunal over Rwanda's objections, the
Security Council established early on a political dynamic of the Tribunal's independence from the State that requested the Tribunal's creation, in addition to the
ICTR's de jure, legal independence. To charges that the Tribunal has so far prosecuted only accused persons from one side of the conflict that resulted in the genocide, and other serious violations of humanitarian law, the prosecutor has made
clear, including to the present Government of Rwanda, which is an outgrowth of
the military victorious Rwanda Patriotic Front, that she intends to indict members
of the RPF against whom evidence of violations of humanitarian law are established. In the case of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, many Serbs, in particular their
political leadership, have accused the Tribunal of anti-Serb bias as a result of their
military defeat at the hands of the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1995 in Bosnia and in 1999 in Kosovo. However, it is closer to the truth
that these groups, steeped in the propaganda of demagogues, lay a doubtful claim
to victimhood when what is really happening is a process of establishing the individual criminal responsibility of their erstwhile leaders.
9 The London Charter did not define the term "criminal organizations."
10 See Prosecutor v. Georges Andersen Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T,
Judgment and Sentence by Trial Chamber I (Dec. 6, 1999). See also Prosecutor v.
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Fourth, the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals had the power
to hand out, and did hand out in several of their judgments, the
death penalty. However, the maximum punishment in the statutes of the Arusha and Hague Tribunals is life imprisonment,
reflecting a movement away from the death penalty in the
evolution of international human rights standards.
Fifth, the Nuremberg Tribunal had no appellate jurisdictions while the UN Tribunals have an Appeals Chamber.
Finally, the two sets of international tribunals have different sets of competencies. The Nuremberg Tribunal's competence covered crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes
against humanity. The ICTR's rationaemateriae deals with genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, for
the Protection of War Victims and Additional Protocol II thereto
of June 8, 1977.11
II.

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

In its Resolution 955 (1994), the Security Council decided to
establish the ICTR "for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons
responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda,
and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such
violations committed in the territory of [neighboring] States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994."
The preamble of the Resolution also stated the raisond'etre
of the International Tribunal as follows:
The Security Council,
...Expressing

once again its grave concern at the reports indicating that genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant
violations of international humanitarian law have been committed in Rwanda, ...
Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective
measures to bring to justice the persons responsible for them,
Omar Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-1, Judgment and Sentence by Trial Chamber I (Feb. 5, 1999).
11 See ICTR Statute, arts. 2-4.
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Convinced that in the particular circumstances of Rwanda, the
prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and the abovementioned violations of international humanitarian law would
enable this aim to be achieved and would contribute to the process
of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance
of peace,
Believing that the establishment of an international tribunal for
the prosecution of persons responsible for the above-mentioned violations of international humanitarian law will contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and effectively redressed.
12

Thus, the main objectives of the ICTR appear to be those of
accountability, deterrence and to contribute to national reconciliation and the maintenance of peace. It is against these
objectives that the jurisprudence of the International Tribunal
should be assessed.
The Tribunal's trial chambers have so far handed down
nine judgments - eight convictions and one acquittal. Twentyone accused persons are currently on trial in eight cases, with
other trials expected to open in the coming months. There are
fifty-two persons detained under the authority of the Tribunal
at the United Nations Detention Facility at Arusha as of September 10, 2002, including those on trial but excluding con13
victed persons.
A.

Genocide

On September 2, 1998, the ICTR in Prosecutorv. Jean-Paul
Akayesu14 delivered the first-ever judgment for the crime of genocide by an international court. The Tribunal's Trial Chamber
had to address the question of whether the widespread and horrendous massacres that took place in Rwanda in 1994 constituted genocide.' 5 In a contemporary sense, this is important
because the word genocide is emotive and is a label frequently
and loosely attached to widespread killings.
Id., pmble.
For information on detainees, see http://www.internews.org/activities/
ICTR-reports/ICTRUNprison_12_00htm.
14 Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment by Trial Chamber I (Sept. 2, 1998).
12
13

15 See id.
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Article 2 of the Statute of the ICTR provides a definition of
genocide, which exactly replicates that in the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide, adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1948
(Genocide Convention). According to Article 2(2) of the ICTR
Statute:
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
16
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Trial Chamber I found that, contrary to popular belief, the
crime of genocide does not require the actual extermination of a
group in its entirety, but is committed once any of the acts mentioned above are committed with the intent to destroy the group
in whole or in part. 17 It also found that genocide is unique
among crimes because of its embodiment of a special intent or
dolus specialis, and this special intent lies in the intent to destroy - wholly or partially - a national, ethnic, racial or relig18
ious group.
The Akayesu judgment established a far-reaching precedent by interpreting for the first time how to apply the definition of the crime of genocide in the Genocide Convention albeit based on the definition in the ICTR Statute - to a practical situation. The Chamber found Akayesu, former mayor of
the Rwandan town of Taba, guilty on nine counts of genocide
and crimes against humanity. 19 He was found not guilty of six
20
violations of Article 3 Common to Geneva Conventions.
16

ICTR Statute, art. 2(2)

17 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment by Trial Chamber I,

para. 497 (Sept. 2, 1998).
18 See id. para. 498.
19 See id. sec. 8.
20

See id.
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Akayesu was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment on
October 2, 2000, and the ICTR Appeals Chamber dismissed his
appeal against conviction and sentence on June 1, 2001.21
Trial Chamber I adopted the reasoning that because the
special intent to commit genocide was to be found in the intent
to destroy - wholly or partially - a national, ethnic, racial or
religious group, the precise meaning of these social categories
needed to be defined. Relying on the travaux prdparatoires(preparatory work) of the Genocide Convention, the ICTR judges
found that a common criterion in these four groups protected by
the Convention was that membership in such groups would not
normally be challenged by members belonging to it automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often irremediable
22
manner.
Based on the Nottebohm 2 3 decision rendered by the International Court of Justice, the ICTR held that a national group
is defined as a collection of people who are perceived to share a
legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties; an ethnic group is generally defined as
a group whose members share a common language or culture;
the conventional definition of racial group is based on the hereditary physical traits often identified with geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious
factors; and the religious group is one whose members share the
24
same religion, denomination or mode of worship.
The application of these legal definitions to the situation in
Rwanda was complicated by the fact that the Tutsi population
did not fit neatly into any of the above definitions, as they did
not have a language or culture of their own different from the
rest of the Rwandan population. Generations of intermarriage
had wiped out any hereditary physical traits that formerly distinguished Tutsi from Hutu, as had a system of classification
based on ownership of cattle. 25 Thus, the absurd conclusion
that could have been drawn from this situation is that the Tutsi
21 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment by the Appeals Chamber (June 1, 2001).
22 See id. para. 511.
23 Nottebohm, International Court of Justice (1995).
24 See id. paras. 512-15.
25 See MAGNARELLA, supra note 8, at 98.
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are not a protected group under the Genocide Convention, and
so genocide, as legally defined by the Convention and the ICTR
26
Statute, had not occurred in Rwanda.
In a demonstration of innovative legal reasoning, the
ICTR's Trial Chamber I asked itself "whether it would be impossible to punish the physical destruction of a group as such
under the Genocide Convention, if the said group, although stable and membership is by birth, does not meet the definition of
any one of the four groups expressly protected by the Genocide
Convention." 2 7 The judges answered in the negative. In their
view, it was "important to respect the intention of the drafters
of the Genocide Convention, which according to the travaux
prdparatoires,was patently to ensure the protection of any stable and permanent group."28
The Chamber held that the Tutsi were a stable and permanent group for the purpose of the Genocide Convention, basing
this conclusion on the clear identification of the Tutsi as an
"ethnic" group in official classifications of Rwandan society, perpetuated by, among other ways, ethnic classifications of all
Rwandans in their national identity cards before 1994.29 This
addition of stable and permanent groups, whose membership is
largely determined by birth, to the rubric of the four protected
groups in the Geneva Convention, will influence future cases
30
involving the crime of genocide.
The judgment of Trial Chamber I of the ICTR in Akayesu
(and the eight other judgments of the Tribunal, which have all
adjudicated, inter alia, the crime of genocide) has provided a
universal precedent to other jurisdictions such as the ICTY and
the International Criminal Court. In this context, it is pertinent
to note that the ICTY handed down its very first conviction for
the crime of genocide on August 2, 2001, in the case of Radislav
Kristic.3 1 Hitherto, that Tribunal had handled mostly cases of
See id.
Id. (quoting Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment by
Trial Chamber I (Sept. 2, 1998)).
28 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment by Trial Chamber
I, para. 516 (Sept. 2, 1998).
29 See id. para. 170
30 See MAGNARELLA, supra note 8, at 99.
31 See Prosecutor v. Kristic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Chamber (Aug. 2,
2001).
26
27
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war crimes (Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
and Violations of the Laws or Customs of War) and crimes
against humanity, and there had been considerable debate over
whether the events in the former Yugoslavia or parts thereof
constituted genocide or were simply extreme cases of ethnic
cleansing. Applying the relevant tests to determine the occurrence of genocide or otherwise, as had been done in several
cases by the Rwanda Tribunal, the Yugoslavia Tribunal in its
judgment in this case, concluded that "by deciding to kill all
men of fighting age, a decision was taken to make it impossible
for the Muslim people of Srebrenica to survive. Stated other32
wise, what was ethnic cleansing became genocide."
B. Rape and Sexual Violence
The ICTR has similarly blazed a trail in international humanitarian law in the area of sexual crimes against women.
The Akayesu case was again the setting for this development.
As in most armed conflicts, civil or international, the Rwandan
conflict had, as a significant characteristic, the systematic raping of women, in this case mostly women of Tutsi origin. In addressing the acts of rape, the judges of the ICTR sought to show
the circumstances in which this sordid act of sexual violence is a
component of the crimes within the competence of the Tribunal.
Rape, which, in and of itself is a crime in most, if not all, national jurisdictions, comes alive in the jurisprudence of the
ICTR as an intrinsic aspect of genocide and crimes against
33
humanity.
In Akayesu, the prosecutor's original indictment of the accused, confirmed on February 16, 1997, did not contain specific
charges of sexual crimes. However, the testimony of two witnesses in the course of the trial contained graphic references to
sexual violence against Tutsi women during the genocide often accompanied by degrading language against the victims
- and some of which, in the Akayesu case, allegedly occurred in
32 Marlise Simons, General Guilty in SrebrenicaGenocide, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3,
2001, at Al.
33 No accused person in the ICTR has yet been convicted of rape as a violation
of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, or even of any other aspect of that
crime itself, although some accused persons and convicts have been charged with
rape under this rubric.
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the location of Akayesu's office at the Bureau Communal. 34 As
a result of these testimonies, the prosecutor conducted further
investigations and amended the indictment during the trial on
June 17, 1997, specifically charging Akayesu, inter alia, with
rape as a crime against humanity in Count 13 of the indictment
and rape as a violation of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions in Count 15. 3 5 Various non-governmental organiza-

tions had also been pressing for greater attention to sexual
crimes in prosecutions at the ICTR, including by way of an ami36

cus curiae brief.

In its judgment, Trial Chamber I explained its acceptance
of the amendment as follows:
On June 17, the indictment was amended to include allegations of
sexual violence and additional charges against the accused under
Article 3(g), Article 3(i) and Article 4(2)(e) of the ICTR Statute. In
introducing the amendment, the Prosecution stated that the testimony of Witness H motivated them to renew their investigations
of sexual violence in connection with events, which took place at
the Bureau Communal. The Prosecution stated that the evidence
previously available was not sufficient to link the Accused with
acts of sexual violence and acknowledged that factors to explain
this lack of evidence might include the shame that accompanies
acts of sexual violence as well as insensitivity in the investigation
of sexual violence. The Chamber understands that the amendment of the indictment resulted from the spontaneous testimony
of sexual violence of witness J and H during the course of this
trial and the subsequent investigation of the prosecution, rather
than from public pressure. Nevertheless the Chamber takes note
of the interest shown in this issue by non-governmental organizations, which it considers indicative of public concern over the historical exclusion of rape and other forms of sexual violence from
the investigation and prosecution of war crimes. The investigation and presentation of evidence relating to sexual violence is in
37
the interest of justice.
34 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment by Trial

Chamber I, para. 691 (Sept. 2, 1998).
35 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR 96-4-1, Amended Indictment (June 17,
1997).
36 See Amicus Curiae Brief, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, available at http://www.
essex.ac.uk/armedcon/Issues/text2000/ictr/001.htm.
37 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment by Trial Chamber
I, para. 417 (Sept. 2, 1998).
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In its judgment, the Trial Chamber found Akayesu guilty of
crimes against humanity (rape) as charged in count 13 of the
indictment. 38 This verdict revolutionized the jurisprudence on
sexual violence crimes in international humanitarian law in
three ways. First, the Akayesu judgment was the first time an
individual had been convicted of rape as a specific crime under
the rubric of crimes against humanity by an international tribunal. The importance of this advance is brought into sharper
perspective by the fact that there was no mention of rape in the
Nuremberg Charter. While there was reference to rape in the
judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East because evidence was presented of atrocities committed
upon women in Nanking, the Philippines and other locations,
rape and sexual violence were not charged as specific crimes,
rather they were lumped together as crimes against humanity
- inhumane treatment. As one commentator and practitioner
of international law so aptly put it:
This situation resulted in a blur. Rape was lost in the barbarous
mass of the overall crimes. It became a passing reference in a tale
of horror. In the end, no one knew whether rape in time of conflict
could be prosecuted as a separate, substantive crime standing on
its own merits in international law . . . but today, we find ourselves in an enormously stronger position to investigate, document and prosecute rape and other forms of sexual violence....
And it all started quietly within the International Criminal Tribu39
nal for Rwanda.
Second, the Akayesu judgment provided a definition of rape
as a crime under international law for the first time in legal
history. In paragraphs 596-98 of the judgment, the Chamber
stated:
The Chamber must define rape, as there is no commonly accepted
definition of this term in international law. While rape has been
defined in certain national jurisdictions as non-consensual intercourse, variations on the act of rape may include acts which involve the insertion of objects and/or the use of bodily orifices not
considered to be intrinsically sexual. The Chamber considers that
See id. para. 696.
39 David Scheffer, Rape as a War Crime, Remarks at Fordham University,
New York, (Oct. 29, 1999), transcriptavailable at www.converge.org.nz/pma.rape.
htm.
38
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rape is a form of aggression and that the central elements of the
crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of
objects or body parts.... The Chamber defines rape as a physical
invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence, which includes rape,
is considered to be any act of a sexual nature which is committed
on a person under circumstances which are coercive.
This groundbreaking definition of rape has been cited in
subsequent cases in the ICTR and the ICTY at The Hague in
4
40
the latter Tribunal's judgments in the Furundzija, Celebici l
and Kunarac4 2 cases. But is the definition so revolutionary as
to be ahead of its time? It is not, although some experts in international criminal law are inclined to that view, and expressed opinions in this vein in informal discussions during
meetings of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment
of the International Criminal Court in New York. Had there
been any problem with this definition, the Tribunal's Appeals
Chamber might have addressed the matter in its judgment on
appeal in Akayesu. To the extent it did not, this brilliant postulation of international humanitarian law must stand for what it
is: a revolution in legal thinking. In this context, note should be
taken of the arguably more conservative approach of ICTY jurisprudence, which has so far examined rape mostly from a na43
tional jurisdiction perspective that is anchored in body parts.
However, a close reading of the jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia
Tribunal reveals an elasticity in adopting national definitions of
rape that encompass parts of the Rwanda Tribunal's definition
in Akayesu.4 4 This would appear to give credence to the holding
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/I-T, Judgment (Dec. 10, 1998).
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment (Nov. 16, 1998).
42 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/2, Judgment (Feb. 22, 2001).
43 See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/I-T, Judgment, para. 177
(Dec. 10, 1998). The ICTY's Trial Chamber II reviewed national laws on rape "to
arrive at an accurate definition of rape based on the criminal law principle of specificity." Id.
44 In Furundzija,the ICTY judges concluded that most legal systems consider
rape as "the forcible sexual penetration of the human body by the penis or the
forcible insertion of any other object into either the vagina or the anus." Id., para.
181. However, Furundzija acknowledged a significant discrepancy between various national definitions of rape when it held that "the forced penetration of the
mouth by the male sexual organ constitutes a most humiliating and degrading
attack upon human dignity" and thus ought to be included in the definition of rape
40
41

Id., para. 183.
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of the ICTR's Trial Chamber I, that its definition of rape is more
helpful in international law. In any event, it is correct to say
that the two types of definitions simply reflect two different approaches to rape in international criminal law.
The third and perhaps most important manner in which
the sexual violence aspect of the Akayesu judgment advanced
international humanitarian law was by ruling that rape was a
constituent form of genocide and thus a genocidal crime. 4 5 As
noted earlier, Trial Chamber I found that rape was systematically used as a weapon in the campaign to destroy the Tutsi by
violating Tutsi women precisely because they were of Tutsi
ethnicity. 46 Many were killed in the process of these rapes, the
clear intent of which was to kill or inflict mental or bodily harm
as part of the process of destroying an ethnic group in whole or
47
in part.
Concluding that the special intent unique to genocide accompanied and motivated these rapes, the Chamber ruled:
In light of all the evidence before it, the Chamber is satisfied that
the acts of rape and sexual violence described above were committed solely against Tutsi women, many of whom were subjected to
the most public humiliation, mutilated and raped several times,
often in public, in the Bureau Communal premises or in other
public places, and often by more than one assailant. These rapes
resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and their communities. Sexual violence was
an integral part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction
and the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole. 48
It is noteworthy that in the indictment against Akayesu,
rape was not specifically charged as an act of genocide. Yet,
based on the overwhelming evidence in that case, the bench of
Chamber I followed the proof of facts to their logical, ultimate
conclusion in their decision: rape as genocide. As another expert has described the judgment - correctly - "the Akayesu
45 See Betty Murungi, ProsecutingGender Crimes at the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for Rwanda, at http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdocdpublications/
.../prosecutingGenderCrimesICTR.htm.
46 See MAGNARELLA, supra note 8, at 102.
47 See id. at 103.
48 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment by Trial Chamber
I, para. 121 (Sept. 2, 1998).
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decision is overwhelming in its holdings and dicta concerning
sexual violence." 4 9 Following Akayesu, there have been other
cases before the ICTR in which charges of rape were proffered
50
against accused persons.
However, women were not only victims in the Rwandan genocide; some are alleged perpetrators too. The ICTR has also
made history by becoming not only the first international criminal tribunal to indict a woman but also the first to charge a
woman with rape. In Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko
and Arsene Shalom Ntahobali, the first accused, Rwanda's Minister of Women and Family Affairs in 1994, was arrested in Kenya in 1997, and was originally indicted jointly with her son,
Arsene Shalom, on charges of genocide, crime against humanity
and serious violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions. Her indictment was amended in 1999 to include
charges of rape as a crime against humanity under the principle
of superior responsibility. 5 1 The indictment had been amended
earlier to include rape as a crime against humanity against Mr.
52
Ntahobali.
These developments in the trials before the ICTR demonstrate the Tribunal's achievement of providing a road map for
the prosecution and adjudication of sexual crimes in international humanitarian law. In so doing, the Tribunal has lifted
sexual crimes against women from the status of mere offenses
against honor 53 and that of a spoil of war to their rightful place
in the code of conduct in conflict situations.
C. Shattering the Concept of "Sovereign Impunity"
All through contemporary history, the international law
doctrine of sovereign immunity, by which a sovereign is immune from legal process for official acts committed in his or her
capacity as head of state, has been mixed with the practice of
49 Betty Murungi, Prosecuting Gender Crimes at the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, AFR. LEGAL AID Q. J. (forthcoming July - August 2001).
50 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20; Prosecutor
v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko & Arsene Shalom Ntahobali, Case No. ICTR-97-21; and
Prosecutor v. Juvenal Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44.
51 See Joe Lauria, Rape Added to Rwandan Woman's UN charges, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 13, 1999, at 6A.
52 See id.
53 See Murungi, supra note 49.
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'sovereign impunity,' in which leaders who have directed and
participated in the most heinous crimes - usually for political
reasons or "reasons of state" - have been beyond the reach of
the law.
As indicated by the preambular paragraphs of Security
Council Resolution 955 of 1994, one of the main objectives of the
ICTR is to deter the culture of impunity by confronting it with
accountability. 54 Indeed, part of the explanation for how more
than 500,000 people could have been killed in a period of three
months in Rwanda in 1994 lies in the fact that, for the past
forty years, there have been cyclical waves of mass killings.
These killings were orchestrated by political leaders in the
Great Lakes region of Africa, in particular Rwanda and
Burundi, with no one held accountable in a judicial process. 55 It
is no surprise, then, that occasional mass killing along ethnic
lines had become something of a favored solution in the internal
political power struggles in the region.
Ensuring accountability for impunity has also been the objective behind the establishment of other international criminal
tribunals such as the ICTY, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 56 the proposed tribunal for Cambodia and the permanent
57
International Criminal Court.
It is commonly agreed, both as a matter of policy in governments and by practitioners of international law, that one of the
most effective ways to ensure the promotion and observance of
international humanitarian law is to bring the political and military leaders who, in virtually every case of mass atrocities in
war and peace, have been the planners, instigators and comSee ICTR Statute, pmbl.
Between 1959 and 1964, hundreds of thousand of Rwandan Tutsi were
killed in Rwanda following the "Social Revolution" of 1959 which toppled and abolished the Tutsi monarchy. The "revolution" was led by Gregoire Kayibanda, a
Hutu extremist who became President of Rwanda when the country became independent in 1962. In neighboring Burundi, where the Tutsi held political power
after independence, Hutus were the victims of mass killings on nearly similar
scales to that of the Tutsi in Rwanda. In 1972, about 100,000 Hutus were massacred in Burundi. These killings in both countries led to massive refugee outflows
into these and other countries in East and Central Africa by the victims of the
massacres.
56 See Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Establishmentof a Special Court
for Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, U.N.Doc. S/2000/915 (2000).
57 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf/
183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
54
55
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manders of such crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes to justice in properly constituted courts of justice. The violations of international humanitarian law in
Rwanda were no exception; they were known to have been inspired and directed by high-ranking individuals. As a matter of
policy, the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTR has, since the
Tribunal commenced operations in 1995, focused most of its
investigative and prosecutorial energies on such high-ranking
accused persons and suspects - the "big fish."58 These individuals have been carefully chosen and cut across various spectra
of Rwandan society's erstwhile leadership: senior military commanders and politicians, senior civilian administrators, the
clergy and senior media practitioners accused of inciting and
sustaining the mass killings in Rwanda with hate
59
propaganda.
In this pantheon of senior figures so far apprehended and
brought to trial by the ICTR, the most senior individual has
been Mr. Jean Kambanda, Prime Minister of Rwanda and Head
of the Interim Government from April 8, 1994, until he left the
country on or about July 17, 1994 - the three months during
which the genocide occurred. Mr. Kambanda was arrested by
the Kenyan authorities in July of 1997 on the basis of a formal
request submitted by the Tribunal's prosecutor on July 9, 1997,
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR. 60 On July 16, 1997, Judge
Laity Kama, ruling on the prosecutor's motion of July 9, 1997,
ordered the transfer and provisional detention of the suspect at

58 See Achievements of the ICTR, available at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/
English/geninfo/achieve.htm.
59 See Marlise Simons, Trial Centers on Role of Press DuringRwanda Massacre, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002 (discussing the crucial precedents legal specialists
believe will be established by the outcome of the joint "media trial" at the ICTR of
Prosecutor v Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Ferdinand Nahimana, and Hassan Ngeze).
60 Rule 40 (A) (i) provides that, in case of urgency, the prosecutor may request
any State to arrest a suspect and place him in custody. While it is more typical for
the Tribunal to issue a warrant of arrest of an accused person against whom an
indictment prepared by the prosecutor has been confirmed by a judge of the Tribunal - which indictment is transmitted to the relevant State by the Registrar of the
Tribunal - the prosecutor resorts to Rule 40 when operational considerations make
it imperative, usually to prevent the escape of a suspect whose location has been
identified but who has not yet been formally indicted by the Tribunal.
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the Detention Facility of the Tribunal under Rule 40bis.6 1 The
indictment against Jean Kambanda was confirmed on October
16, 1997, by Judge Yakov Ostrovsky, who issued a warrant of
62
arrest and ordered the continued detention of the accused.
The indictment against Mr. Kambanda charged the former
Prime Minister with genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide,
direct and public incitement to commit genocide, complicity in
genocide, and crimes against humanity. 63 In the concise statement of facts in the indictment, the prosecutor averred, inter
alia, that Mr. Kambanda as Prime Minister exercised de jure
and de facto authority and control over the members of his government, senior civil servants including prefets (regional governors), and senior officers in the military; and that he presided
over meetings of the Council of Ministers, attended by Pauline
64
Nyiramasuhuko, Eliezer Niyitegeka and Andre Ntagerura
among others, in which the massacres of the civilian population
were discussed. He was also accused of inciting massacres of
Tutsi and moderate Hutu at public meetings and through the
65
media.
In a major development in the annals of international humanitarian law and the work of the ICTR, Jean Kambanda, at
his initial appearance before the Tribunal on May 1, 1998,
pleaded guilty to the six counts in his indictment. Mr. Kambanda had signed a plea agreement with the prosecutor in
which he agreed that he was pleading guilty because he was in
fact guilty and acknowledged full responsibility for the crimes
alleged in the indictment. 66 In the document, Kambanda explained the motivation for his guilty plea: "the profound desire
to tell the truth . . .his desire to contribute to the process of
61 See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence (Sept. 4, 1998).
62 See id.
63 See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-DP, Indictment (Oct.
16, 1997).
64 These former officials are among eleven cabinet ministers in Mr. Kambanda's government who are currently on trial or detained by the ICTR.
65 See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-DP, Indictment (Oct.
16, 1997).
66 See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Plea Agreement Between Jean Kambanda and the Office of the Prosecutor, Annexure A to the Joint
Motion for Consideration of Plea Agreement Between Jean Kambanda and the Office of the Prosecutor (Apr. 29, 1998).
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national reconciliation in Rwanda," and his consideration that
his confession would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace in Rwanda. 67 Trial Chamber I verified the validity of Kambanda's guilty plea 6s before formally entering a plea
of guilty and setting a date for the pre-sentencing hearing.
On September 4, 1998, Trial Chamber I convicted Mr.
Kambanda on all counts in the indictment against him, and
sentenced the former Prime Minister to life imprisonment for
his crimes. 6 9 The ICTR thus became the first international tribunal in history to punish a head of government for genocide,
dealing the first practical blow to the concept of sovereign immunity, which had been expressly negated in the Statute of the
70
Tribunal.
Indeed, the Chamber made clear in its judgment and sentence that, despite the ordinarily mitigating factor of a guilty
plea, it considered the combination of the gravity of the offense
and Mr. Kambanda's high position of authority to be overridingly aggravating factors. The Chamber stated:
The heinous nature of the crime of genocide and its absolute prohibition makes its commission inherently aggravating ... The
crimes were committed during the time when Jean Kambanda
was Prime Minister and he and his government were responsible
for the maintenance of peace and security. Jean Kambanda
abused his authority and the trust of the civilian population. He
personally participated in the genocide by distributing arms,
making incendiary speeches and presiding over cabinet and other
meetings where the massacres were planned and discussed. He
67

See id.

See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence (Sept. 4, 1998). Kambanda affirmed that: (a) his guilty was voluntary; (b) he
clearly understood the charges against him and the consequences of his guilty
plea; and (c) his guilty plea was unequivocal, in other words, the said plea could
not be refuted by any line of defense. See id.
69 See id.
70 Article 6, which provides for individual criminal responsibility for crimes
within the Tribunal's competence, states in sub-para (2): "The official position of
any accused person, whether as Head of State or government or as a responsible
government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor
mitigate punishment." An identical provision is contained in the Statute of the
ICTY, and the Nuremberg Charter contained a similar provision. However, the
ICTR judgment in Kambanda was the first-ever application of the provision in
practice to an individual of such senior rank in a government.
68
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failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent 7his
1
subordinates from committing crimes against the population.
Jean Kambanda's subsequent appeal against his judgment and
sentence, in which he requested a trial or, in the alternative, a
reduction of his sentence, was unanimously rejected and his
sentence confirmed by the Tribunal's Appeals Chamber on October 19, 2000.72
The Kambanda case was another milestone in international humanitarian law, with overwhelming political and other
significance. 7 3 It was the first confession by an individual for
the crime of genocide, fifty years after the Genocide Convention.
It confirmed that the criminal enterprise that was Rwanda's genocide was a state-sponsored plan aimed at wiping out the
country's ethnic minority. 74 Kambanda's confession destroyed
the credibility, such as it existed, of a small number of revisionist historians and lawyers in certain quarters who claimed that
there was no genocide in Rwanda, and it had a discernible impact on the more than 100,000 genocide suspects imprisoned in
Rwanda jails by triggering a significant number75of confessions
from some of these suspects shortly afterwards.
Most significant in a contemporary and global sense, the
Kambandajudgment pre-dated and was cited by human rights
groups in the 1998 case in which the United Kingdom's House
of Lords ruled that General Augusto Pinochet, former Head of
State of Chile, was not immune from prosecution for international crimes such as crimes against humanity, torture and hostage-taking, overruling a lower court. 76 Even more directly, the
Kambanda judgment serves as precedent for the 1999 indict71 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence,
paras. 42, 44 (Sept. 4, 1998).
72 See Kambanda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-23-A, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber (Oct. 19, 2000).

73 See MAGNARELLA, supra note 8, at 85, 93.
74 See Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, "RwandaPanel'sLegacy: They Can Run But
Not Hide," INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 31 - Nov. 1 1998, at 6.
75 See MAGNARELLA, supra note 8, at 93.
76 See Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police (Appellants) Ex Parte
Pinochet (Respondent); Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police and
Others (Appellants) Ex Parte Pinochet (Respondent), Decision of the House of
Lords on appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division (Nov. 25,
1998), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldjudmnt
jd981125/pino01.htm.
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ment and recent transfer to The Hague of Slobodan Milosevic,
former President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to face
trial before the ICTY. Considering the legal parallels between
the Kambanda case and that of Milosevic, 7 7 the ICTY Trial
Chamber in the Milosevic case will, in all probability, make significant references to the ICTR's Kambanda judgment in its future judgment of Milosevic.
D.

Can Civilians be Guilty of Violations of the Geneva
Conventions?

Another important aspect of the jurisprudence of the ICTR
is the question of whether civilians can be convicted for serious
violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and
of Additional Protocol II.7 While these offenses are more traditionally associated with members of armed forces, partly because they are part of the corpus of the laws of war; the
Rwandan conflict in 1994 produced situations in which there
was a blur in the alleged roles of civilian officials during the
conflict, with several of them appearing to exercise military or
quasi-military functions in conjunction with army commanders.
More importantly, the ICTR's Trial Chamber I stated the opinion, based on the Tokyo trials of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, that civilians may be held liable for
79
breaches of the laws of war.
Thus, several indictments of accused persons in the ICTR
who held civilian positions in Rwanda during the violations of
humanitarian law in 1994 had included charges of serious viola77 See Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Peace Through Justice:Rwanda's Precedent
for the Trial of Milosevic, WASH. POST, July 6,1999, at A15.
78 ICTR Statute, art. 4. These violations include, but are not limited to: (a)
Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular
murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; (b) Collective punishments; (c) Taking of hostages; (d) Acts of terrorism; (e) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
(f) Pillage; (g) The passing of sentence and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples; (h)
Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts. Id.
79 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment by Trial
Chamber I, para. 634 (Sept. 2, 1998). The Chamber recalled, inter alia, that
Hirota, the former Foreign Minister of Japan, was convicted at Tokyo for crimes
committed during the rape of Nanking. Id.
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tions of Article 3.80 However, as noted earlier, in none of the
cases completed so far - all involving civilians - in which this
crime was alleged has the Tribunal entered a conviction on this
specific charge."" The reason for this situation is to be found in
the legal findings of Trial Chamber I in the Akayesu judgment
regarding five of the fifteen counts in his indictment that alleged violations of Common Article 3. The Chamber held that
for Akayesu to be criminally responsible under Article 4 of the
Statute, the prosecutor had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Akayesu, by virtue of his authority as a mayor, was either
responsible for the outbreak of, or was otherwise directly engaged in, the conduct of hostilities.8 2 This position of the Chamber was held despite witness testimony that he was seen
wearing a military jacket, carrying a rifle and assisting the military in their tasks. Hence, the prosecutor had to prove either
that Akayesu was a member of the armed forces under the military command of either of the belligerent parties (the Rwandan
Patriotic Front and the Rwandan Armed Forces of the government at the time), or that he was legitimately mandated and
expected, as a public official or agent or person otherwise holding public authority or de facto representing the government, to
support or fulfill the war efforts.8 3 Considering these criteria
and based on the evidence presented in the case, the Chamber
ruled that Akayesu did not incur individual criminal responsiConvenbility for violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva
8 4
tions of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims.
In the judgment of the ICTR's Trial Chamber II in Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, 5 the Chamber
advanced the jurisprudence in Akayesu by holding that, for a
civilian to be culpable for violations of Common Article 3 and
80 This may be more a matter of prosecutorial policy and discretion because
while it was certainly the case in indictments proffered by the two previous Prosecutors of the Tribunal, Justice Richard Goldstone and Justice Louise Arbour respectively, it would appear from her indictments that the present Prosecutor, Ms.
Carla Del Ponte, is not inclined to follow this practice.
81 See comments, supra note 33.
52 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment by Trial
Chamber I, para. 640 (Sept. 2, 1998).
83 See id.
84 See id. paras. 643-44.
85 See Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR - 95 - I-T, Judgment of Trial Chamber II (May 21, 1999).
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Additional Protocol II, a "nexus" between the crimes alleged and
the armed conflict had to be established, in addition to direct
engagement in the conduct of hostilities, or a legitimate mandate or expectation of such people as public office holders or de
facto representatives of the government, to support the war effort. 86 The accused people in this case, although convicted of
genocide and crimes against humanity, were similarly acquitted
on counts of their indictment charging them with violations of

Common Article
88

3.87

The Tribunal's Appeals Chamber upheld

this judgment.
The jurisprudence of the ICTR, while recognizing that the
laws of war apply to civilians as well as military personnel, has
raised the standard of proof needed to convict civilians of such
crimes to a high one indeed. It is safe to surmise that the
"nexus" and direct-mandate tests may not be as difficult to establish in the trials of military commanders expected to begin in
the ICTR in the coming months, although the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of specific, individual criminal responsibility remains the same.
III.

STATE COOPERATION

The very idea of international criminal justice for violations
of international humanitarian law, is predicated on the cooperation of States with the international criminal tribunals. It could
not have been otherwise, for the ICTR and the ICTY have no
police force and no prisons of their own. The legal basis for the
cooperation of States with the ICTR is provided in Article 2 of
Security Council Resolution 955. In Article 2, the Council decided "that all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal... and that consequently all States shall take
any measures necessary under their domestic law to implement
the provisions of the resolution and the Statute" of the Tribunal. Article 2 provided that implementing the provisions of the
resolution and the Statute included the obligation of States to
comply with requests or orders issued by a Trial Chamber
under Article 28 of the Statute.
See id. paras. 590-624.
See id.
88 See id.
86
87
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Article 28 of the Statute (Cooperation and Judicial Assistance) provides:
1. States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal for
Rwanda in the investigation and prosecution of persons
accused of committing serious violations of international
humanitarian law.
2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for
assistance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber, including
but not limited to:
(a) The identification and location of persons;
(b) The taking of testimony and production of evidence;
(c) The service of documents;
(d) The arrest or detention of persons;
(e) The surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal for Rwanda.
Several States, mostly in Africa, Europe and North
America, have extended cooperation to the ICTR as envisaged
by the Statute of the Tribunal.8 9 Under international law, decisions of the United Nations Security Council are binding on
Member States, and the Tribunal was established under the
Council's peace enforcement powers in Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter. Article 48 of the Charter obligates
Member States to support decisions of the Security Council by
cooperating in their implementation.
A.

Monism and Dualism in InternationalLaw and State
Cooperation with the ICTR

If decisions of the Security Council ought to be automatically binding on States, why does Article 2 of Resolution 955
requests States to take any measures necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions of the resolution and
the Tribunal's Statute? Are the decisions of the Security Council somehow, then, subordinate to the domestic laws of Member
States? Certainly, the answer is no, for the reasons that follow.
The first part of the answer to this seeming - but artificial 89 See supra note 13. Individuals sought by the Tribunal have been arrested
in, and transferred from the following States so far: Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Denmark, France, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Netherlands,
South Africa, Switzerland, Tanzania, Togo, United Kingdom, United States, and
Zambia.
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contradiction lies in Article 2 itself, in which the Security Council "[d]ecides that all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal" (second emphasis added). Both words are
mandatory in law. The second part of the answer is that, in
making it mandatory for States to take necessary measures
under their domestic law, the Council, intentionally or not,
makes a practical recognition of the theories of monism and dualism in the relation between international law and municipal
law.
According to monism, international law and state laws are
mutually reinforcing aspects of one system - law in general.
Monists believe that all law is a single system of legal rules that
are binding - whether on States, on individuals or on nonState entities. 90 Dualists believe that the juridical origins: of
state law and international law are fundamentally different;
the source of state law being the will of the state itself, and that
of international law being the common will.9 1 Thus, in the dualist view, for international law to apply within the domestic
sphere, it needs to be enabled, empowered, or validated by domestic legislation.
The practical impact of the monist and dualist attitudes to
international law (which in any event is far more relevant in
relation to the law of treaties) on the work of the ICTR is that it
tends to condition how national institutions, including judicial
institutions and law enforcement agencies, react or pro-act to
the needs or requests of the International Tribunal for judicial
cooperation or assistance. States with a dualist approach believe that, to facilitate effective cooperation with the ICTR, it is
necessary to adopt enabling domestic legislation. States with a
monist perspective to international law and relations see no legal impediment to cooperating with the International Tribunal's requests for arrests of suspects in their territory and their
transfer to the Tribunal at Arusha. 9 2 On the whole, the ICTR
has had a high degree of cooperation from States, which accounts for the high success rate the Tribunal has achieved in
90 See I.A. SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (1994).
91 Id.

92 A State may not adhere to the dualist view and yet not extend full cooperation to the Tribunal for political or other non-legal reasons. This situation was
encountered in a number of countries in the early years of the work of the
Tribunal.
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apprehending high-ranking former Rwandan officials who took
refuge in various countries. In some instances, legal challenges
93
in domestic courts, in the rare instance of a protracted nature,
have delayed the transfer of accused persons to the ICTR.
Irrespective of whether or not a State is monist or dualist,
as the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated in the
formative stages of the Yugoslavia Tribunal,
The establishment of the International Tribunal on the basis of a
to
Chapter VII decision creates a binding obligation on all States
94
take whatever steps are required to implement the decision.
Furthermore, as stated by a respected publicist in a discussion
of international tribunals and the operation of municipals
courts,
The fact that municipal courts must pay primary regard to municipal law in the event of a conflict with international law, in no
of the state concerned to perform its
way affects the obligations
95
international obligations.
Thus, while enabling legislation in the national sphere for
state cooperation with the ICTR is welcome and encouraged,
the obligation of States to cooperate with the Tribunal remains
binding. In cases of non-cooperation, the Tribunal has recourse
- that of a formal report to the Security Council, which may
take measures, including sanctions, against a non-cooperating
96
State.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that through the cooperation and judicial assistance it receives from States, many of the
instances being high-profile cases, the ICTR has contributed to
the promotion of international humanitarian law in the cooperating States. This is particularly true of African States, where
violations of humanitarian law persist as a major problem.
93 In the Elizaphan Ntakirutimana case, a former Seventh Day Adventist pastor indicted by the ICTR and arrested in the United States in September 1996
challenged his surrender to the Tribunal all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court,
but ultimately without success. He was transferred to the ICTR in March 2000.
94 Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704/Add. 1 (1993).
95 SHEARER, supra note 90, at 78.
96 See id.
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DEFENSE OF PERSONS ACCUSED OF VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL HuMANITARIAN LAW

The ICTR has not only promoted international humanitarian law through the prosecution of accused persons. In the
context of these prosecutions, the Tribunal strives to maintain
the highest standards by ensuring fair trials. One of the most
important aspects of a fair trial is a credible defense of the accused, the absence of which would have left the ICTR as something of a kangaroo court whose judgments would be fair game
for an unkind, and valid judgment of history. At the International Tribunal, the accused may engage a lawyer at his expense, but the Tribunal has an extensive body of rules and
regulations under which an accused person who is indigent may
be assigned counsel for his defense at the expense of the Tribunal, or in other words, legal aid. These regulations include
Rules 44-46 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence,9 7 as well as the Directive on the Assignment of Defence
Counsel by the Registrar, 98 as adopted by the Judges of the
tribunal.
However, this area of work of the Tribunal has generated a
corpus of jurisprudence, mainly due to orchestrated attempts by
some accused persons, their lawyers and political sympathizers,
to manipulate the legal aid regime of the Tribunal for subjective
interests, including the obvious purpose of delaying trials. The
rights of the accused are enshrined in Article 20 of the Statute
of the Tribunal, which makes it clear that all persons are equal
before the Tribunal. These rights include the right of the accused to:
Defend himself or herself in person or through legal assistance of
his own choosing; to be informed, if he or she does not have legal
assistance of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to
him or her, in any case where the interests of justice so require,
and without payment by him or her in any such case if he or she
does not have sufficient means to pay for it. 99
97 See ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroott
ENGLISH/rules/index.htm.
98 See ICTR Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel at http://www.

ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/basicdocs/directiveadc.htm.
99 See ICTR Statute, art. 20(4)(d).

27

PACE INT'L L. REV.

[Vol. 14:273

The bone of contention in many Tribunal cases has been
whether an indigent accused person who, pursuant to Article
20(4)(d) of the Statute, has a right to be assigned counsel to defend him or her, additionally has the right to choose or impose
particular counsel, at the Tribunal's expense. Akayesu was the
main case in which this matter played out, leading to much controversy in the media. The Tribunal's Registry, which assigns
defense counsel to indigent accused, was portrayed by individuals and groups as being biased against the accused. Akayesu
had made five requests for replacement of counsel, based on
"lack of confidence" in his lawyers, all of which were honored by
the Registrar. 10 0 His frequent changes of defense lawyers cost
the Tribunal over $500,000.101 Upon a subsequent request, the
Registrar refused to assign him new counsel of his choice. 10 2 As
Akayesu had made the question of lack of counsel of his choice a
main ground of his appeal, the Appeals Chamber stated:
The Appeals Chamber holds that.., the right to free legal assistance by counsel does not confer the right to counsel of one's own
choosing... The right to choose one's counsel is therefore guaranteed only for accused who can bear the financial burden of retaining counsel. The Appeals Chamber recalls the Tribunal's practice
in respect of indigent accused: the Registrar assigns counsel to an
indigent accused from a list of available counsel whom he considers qualified under the Tribunal's official criteria. To be sure, the
Tribunal's case law gives the opportunity to choose from amongst
the counsel on that list. It is, nevertheless, also true that the Registrar is not necessarily bound by the wishes of an indigent accused. Indeed, he has wide discretion, which he exercises in the
3
interest of justice. 10
The decision of the Appeals Chamber vindicated the position of the Tribunal's Registry: that an indigent accused has a
right to be assigned counsel, but no right of selection. Hopefully, it has settled the law in a clear manner and overruled
100 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment by Trial
Chamber I, para. 69 (Sept. 2, 1998).
101 See Press Release, ICTR/INFO-9-2-168, The Six Lawyers of Akayesu (Feb.
25, 1999) at http://www.ictr.org.
102 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment by Trial
Chamber I, paras. 45-48 (Sept. 2, 1998).
103 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber
(June 1, 2001).
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attempts to establish unrealistic
standards in the legal aid re4

10
gime of the Tribunal.

The ICTR also established precedent in another important
and related area: situations where an accused person declines
to be represented by counsel. The most famous contemporary
example of this situation is the trial of former Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic at the ICTY. Mr. Milosevic has declined to
formally appoint a lawyer or accept the assignment by that Tribunal to represent his interests, hence the appointment by the
ICTY of a number of lawyers as amicus curiae (friend of the
court) to assist the Tribunal - but not the defendant directly.
This untidy situation arose earlier at the ICTR but has been
decisively and innovatively dealt with by the Tribunal. Rule 45
Quater of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides that a Trial Chamber may, in the interest of justice, instruct the Registrar to assign counsel to represent the interests
of the accused. This new rule formalized a power that the Tribunal previously exercised under its "inherent powers." In The
Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, FerdinandNahimana
and HassanNgeze, 10 5 Trial Chamber I instructed the Registrar
of the Tribunal to assign counsel to represent the interests of
one of the three accused persons, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza. Mr.
Barayagwiza, who is indigent and so was assigned a defense
counsel by the Tribunal, declined to accept the assigned counsel
in a move that was viewed by the Trial Chamber as an attempt
to obstruct the progress of the trial.
Again, these developments in the work of the Tribunal are
helping to clarify the limits of an important area of international criminal law: the defense of accused persons to ensure a
fair trial.
V.

THE

ICTR

AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

In the journey of the development of international humanitarian law, traced here from the Nuremberg trials to the present day, perhaps the most important development has been
104

See, e.g., Michail Wladimiroff, The Assignment of Defence Counsel before the
LEIDEN J. OF INT'L L. 957, 957-68

InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor Rwanda, 12
(1999).

105 Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision/Request
for Withdrawal of Defense Counsel (Jan. 31, 2000).
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the adoption of the Rome Statute establishing the permanent
International Criminal Court (ICC or Court) in July 1998.106
The Rome Statute went into legal force on July 1, 2002, following a tidal wave of ratifications by more than the required sixty
States by April 2002 - much earlier than had been anticipated
by even the most enthusiastic supporters and proponents of the
Court. 10 7 But it is doubtful that the ICC would have become a
reality when it did without the establishment and success of the
ICTR and the ICTY.
The Rwanda Tribunal actively participated in the meetings
of the Preparatory Committee for the establishment of the
Court and in the work of the Preparatory Commission of the
Court. In that context, the Tribunal made important contributions to the Statute of the ICC. Chief among these was its successful advocacy, taken up by several non-governmental
organizations and States, for the establishment of a comprehensive system of restitutive justice in the ICC that would cater to
victims of crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court, including
the establishment of a trust fund for victims.10 8 These innovative suggestions were inspired by the ICTR's own experience
and challenges in providing effective support to witnesses who
testified at the Tribunal. 10 9
Similarly, the ICTR has much to offer a permanent ICC in
terms of a wealth of groundbreaking jurisprudence, which has
been discussed above. With respect to practical operations in
areas both legal, and not strictly legal, which serve as essential
support functions for the legal work of an international criminal
See Rome Statute, art. I.
As of September 10, 2002, 78 countries had ratified the Rome Statute.
108 Article 75 of the Rome Statute provides for reparations for victims through
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation, while Article 79 provides for the establishment of a Trust Fund for victims for these purposes. See also the Statement
of the ICTR Registrar to the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, which met in New York from March 16 - April 3,
1998.
109 Rule 34(ii) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR provides
that a Victims and Witnesses Support Unit shall: "Ensure that [victims and witnesses] receive relevant support, including physical and psychological rehabilitation, especially counseling in cases of rape and sexual assault." The provision in
Article 43.6 of the ICC Statute is broadly similar: it provides that a Victims and
Witnesses Unit shall "provide... counseling and other appropriate assistance to
witnesses, victims who appear before the Court, and others who are at risk on
account of testimony given by such witnesses."
106
107
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court, the ICTR is making its experience available as the process of formulating the practical operating framework of the
ICC unfolds. These areas include witness support and protection, defense counsel issues, and administration and financing
of the Court. The contributions of the ICTR to the establishment of a permanent framework of international criminal justice are particularly unique because the Tribunal operated in a
difficult environment without adequate external support infrastructure, overcoming several obstacles in the process. A practical example is the Tribunal's witness support and protection
operations, which are undertaken in a region of the world with
no prior history of witness protection, and yet has been largely
successful. The ICC, although located in The Hague - an advanced country with adequate infrastructure - will undertake
operations on a global scale, and many of these operations, be
they arrests or movements of witnesses, will take place in countries with an operating environment similar to what the ICTR
has experienced.
VI.

CONCLUSION: THE

ICTR

AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN AFRICA

The ICTR is not operating in a political or environmental
vacuum. The debilitating effects of abuse of power by political
leadership and authority have been particularly marked in Africa, where the principle of accountability has been absent for
several decades as a result of the absence of strong, independent institutions. In this context, the ICTR is the first international judicial institution to call erstwhile powerful political and
military leaders in Africa to judicial account for grave violations
of humanitarian law. Its work is pioneering the establishment
of the rule of law in Africa, which must take root if Africa is to
leave behind its cycles of violence and poverty and achieve political stability and progress. Admittedly, this is a slow process,
and not an overnight event. The work of the Tribunal sends a
strong message to the leaders and warlords who have retarded
Africa's political evolution and social cohesion.
It is understandable, then, that the ICTR's policy preference is generally to enforce its sentences in African prisons. 1 10
The aim is to have a greater deterrent effect against impunity
110

See generally, ICTR Statute, art. 23.
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in the continent. Agreements for the enforcement of the Tribunal's sentences have been signed between the UN Tribunal and
three African countries - Mali, Benin and Swaziland, and
other agreements are currently being negotiated with other African countries. 1 '" On December 10, 2001, six convicts of the
Tribunal, including the former Rwandan Prime Minister Kambanda, were transferred to Mali to begin serving their prison
sentences. 112 Kambanda thus became the first national political leader in history to be imprisoned for the crime of genocide.
Unquestionably, the example that has been set by the
Rwanda Tribunal, that international criminal justice is workable and it is possible to bring high-ranking individuals suspected of violations of international humanitarian law to
justice, influenced the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone. Prior to the international community's decision to
establish the Special Court as a separate judicial entity, several
individuals and groups within Africa and outside the continent
called for the expansion of the ICTR mandate to try suspects for
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Sierra
Leone. 1 3 As it is, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
4
ICTR will apply mutatis mutandis to the Sierra Leone Court.1
This is an important contribution by ICTR to the work of the
Special Court. It is envisaged that the ICTR will provide expertise and advice to the Special Court, in the form of consultations
by judges of both jurisdictions, training of prosecutors, investigators and administrative support staff, and sharing of information, documents, judgments and other relevant legal
material on a continuous basis." 5
Independent and impartial judiciaries remain key to the establishment of the rule of law in Africa. The "African renaissance" will be difficult to achieve without justice and the rule of
111 See Press Release, ICTR/INFO-9-2-163, ICTR Registrar Meets Mali's Head
of State, Concludes Agreement on Enforcement of Sentences (Feb. 12, 1999); Press
Release, ICTR/INFO-9-2-200, Agreement on Enforcement of Tribunal Sentences
Signed in Benin (Aug. 26, 1999); and Press Release, ICTR/INFO-9-2-240, Swaziland Agrees to Enforce ICTR Sentences (Aug. 31, 2000) at http://www.ictr.org.
112 See Press Release, ICTR/INFO-9-2-296, Former Prime Minister and Five
Other Convicts Sent to Prison in Mali (Dec. 11, 2001), at http://www.ictr.org.
113 See Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Sierra Leone: No Peace Without Justice,
WEST AFR. MAG., June 12-18, at 8.
114 ICTR RULE P. EVID. 13.
115 See Report of the Secretary-General,supra note 56, at 12.
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law. The absence of both accountability and the rule of law is
the root cause of Africa's problems. For this reason, it is vital
that the continent embrace and become engaged with the work
of the ICTR and internalize the latter's jurisprudence and
larger meaning within its various national jurisdictions. The
work of the Tribunal is a symbol of the key to Africa's future. If
justice or the lack thereof represents the difference between Africa's progress, on the one hand, and its stagnation and retrogression on the other, then the future of that continent may lie
in whether it can move from a culture of impunity to one of accountability represented by the work of the ICTR.
At a global level, on the long road from Nuremberg to
Rome, the Tribunal's weighty milestones of precedent for the
international rule of law are being increasingly recognized. Out
of Africa have come not only the more widely reported mass killings but also a road map of exactly how impunity can be
successfully addressed through the effective enforcement of international humanitarian law.
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